Universities and fundamental research: reflections on the growth of university-industry partnership by Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna et al.
ISSN 0962-4031
UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
Universities and Fundamental Research:
Reflections on the Growth of University-Industry
Partnership
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky
(University of Nottingham)
John Beath
Donald S. Siegel
(University of Nottingham)
No.0201
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
St. Salvator's College
St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL
Scotland
2            
Universities and Fundamental Research:
Reflections on the Growth of University-Industry Partnerships‡
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky*
School of Economics
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG7 2RD
England, U.K.
jpt@nottingham.ac.uk
John Beath
Department of Economics
University of St. Andrews
St. Andrews
Fife KY16 9AL
Scotland, U.K.
jab@st-andrews.ac.uk
Donald S. Siegel
Nottingham University Business School
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG8 1BB
England, U.K.
don.siegel@nottingham.ac.uk
November 2001
This version: January 2002
(Forthcoming in Oxford Review of Economic Policy)
                                                          
‡ We thank Tim Jenkinson, John Flemming, Bronwyn Hall, David Ulph and participants at the
editorial seminar in Oxford for helpful comments.  The usual disclaimer applies.
* Corresponding author.  Tel. +44-115-9515468, Fax +44-115-9514159.
3Universities and Fundamental Research:
Reflections on the Growth of University-Industry Partnerships
Abstract
The recent rise in university-industry partnerships has stimulated an
important public policy debate regarding how these relationships affect
fundamental research.  In this paper, we examine the antecedents and
consequences of policies to promote university-industry alliances.  Although the
preliminary evidence appears to suggest that these partnerships have not had a
deleterious effect on the quantity and quality of basic research, some legitimate
concerns have been raised about these activities that require additional analysis.
We conclude that additional research is needed to provide a more accurate
assessment of the optimal level of commercialisation.
Keywords: University-Industry Partnerships, Basic Research, Research Joint
                    Ventures (RJVs), Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs), National
                    Co-operative Research Act (NCRA), Bayh-Dole Act.
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4I. INTRODUCTION
An important trend in several nations has been a substantial increase in
university-industry partnerships.  In the U.S., such growth can be attributed to
several key changes in technology policy that were implemented in the 1980s,
with broad bipartisan support.  These initiatives include the explicit relaxation
of antitrust laws to promote co-operative research, the expansion of public
funding to support technology partnerships, and the adoption of various
initiatives to promote more rapid diffusion of technologies from universities to
firms.  Such alliances have become a prominent feature of the “new” knowledge-
based economy, which places a stronger emphasis on intellectual property and
knowledge capital, as opposed to physical capital and other conventional inputs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the antecedents and consequences
of policies to promote university-industry partnerships.  In doing so, we identify
the innovation market failures which these policies are designed to address.  We
also discuss the benefits and drawbacks of increasing the commercialisation of
university research.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section II presents an
historical overview of policies to facilitate university-industry partnerships.  The
following section identifies the innovation market failures that these policies are
addressing.  Section IV assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of
university-industry alliances.  In conducting this analysis, we focus on the
critical question of how universities should determine the optimal level of
5commercialisation.  We conclude with an examination of some concerns
regarding university management of intellectual property and offer some
suggestions for additional research.
II. ANTECEDENTS OF POLICIES TO FACILITATE UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, there was a pervasive slowdown in
productivity growth and a concomitant decline in the competitiveness of firms in
high-technology industries.  An alleged culprit of this downturn in economic
performance was a decline in the rate of technological innovation.  Concerns
regarding these deleterious trends were particularly strong in the United Sates
and induced a major re-examination of the goals and tactics of various aspects of
U.S. technology policy.
One dimension of innovative activity that was believed to be in dire need
of reform was university-industry technology transfer.  Several leading experts
on technology had asserted that American firms were not commercialising
university-based technologies at a sufficiently rapid rate to maintain the nation’s
technological leadership.  Reflecting the spirit of the times, U.S. policymakers
also wished to emulate the success of Japanese firms, who had captured
substantial market share from American firms in key sectors.  These lawmakers
wished to respond to this “Japanese challenge” by adopting two features of
6Japanese technology policy: a stronger emphasis on collaborative research and
government support for early-stage, generic technologies in targeted areas.1
As a result, several key pieces of legislation were enacted in the U.S.,
which resulted in a rapid rise in university-industry partnerships.  The critical
legislative event in this arena was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which
dramatically changed the rules governing university management of intellectual
property.  Bayh-Dole established a uniform policy across federal agencies
regarding patents, eliminated many restrictions on licensing, and most
importantly, allowed universities (rather than the federal government) to own
patents arising from federal research grants.  A second legislative initiative was
the National Co-operative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984, which provided
additional incentives for firms to engage in research joint ventures (RJVs), by
significantly reducing antitrust penalties associated with collaborative
research.2,3
Funding initiatives aimed at promoting technology partnerships also
stimulated university-industry collaborations.  The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 established the U.S. Commerce Department’s
Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which supports collaborative research
projects on generic technologies, some of which involve research joint ventures
between firms and universities.  Prominent public-funded technology
                                                          
1 Such legislators insisted that such initiatives did not constitute an “industrial policy.”
2 See Link, Paton, and Siegel (2001) for additional discussion of the antecedents and
consequences of NCRA. The NCRA was subsequently amended by the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act (NCRPA), which was enacted in July 1993.  NCRPA amended the
NCRA to include joint research and production joint ventures.
7partnerships in other OECD nations include the VLSI (Very Large Scale
Integrated Circuit) programme in Japan and the ESPRIT (European Strategic
Program for Research and Development of Information Technology) and
EUREKA (European Research Co-ordinating Agency) programmes in the
European Union.
During the 1980s, the U.S. National Science Foundation (a
federal/national agency) also substantially increased funding for Industry-
University Co-operative Research Centres (IUCRCs).  IUCRCs, which depend on
industry support, are designed to promote technological diffusion,
commercialisation, and integration of research and education.  Many universities
in all OECD nations have also established science parks and incubators on or
near campus, which may be viewed as another relevant type of technology
partnerships.4  These institutions often receive additional financial support from
individual state or regional governments, since they are perceived as promoting
economic growth and development.
A salient point regarding these technology partnerships is that they all
receive some level of support from a public institution.  Such assistance can
assume various forms, such as government subsidies for projects funded by
private firms (e.g., ATP or EUREKA), shared use of expertise and laboratory
facilities (e.g., IUCRCs), and public financial support for university-based
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Jaffe (2000) surveys the major changes in U.S. patent policy and practice in the last  two
decades.
4 The first U.K. science parks were established by Cambridge and Heriot-Watt Universities.
8institutions devoted to the creation of entrepreneurial start-ups (e.g., technology
incubators and science parks).
The end result of these initiatives has been substantial growth in the
incidence and scope of university-industry relationships.   As a result, almost all
research universities in the U.S. have established technology transfer offices
(TTOs) to manage these relationships and facilitate commercial knowledge
transfers.  Accordingly, the number of patents granted to U.S. universities has
increased from 300 in 1980 to 3,661 in 1999, while licenses have increased
almost twelve-fold since 1991.5 Membership in the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM), an organisation of licensing officers at U.S.
universities, has increased from less than 113 in 1979 to over 2,178 in 1999.
Annual licensing revenue has grown from $160 million in 1991 to $862 million in
1999, now constituting about 2.7% of university R&D expenditures.
Similar increases are evident for other dimensions of university-industry
technology transfer.  Link (1996) reports that university participation in RJVs
has risen steadily since the enactment of NCRA in 1984.  Hall, Link, and Scott
(2000) find that 57% of the research projects funded by ATP involved firms
collaborating with universities.  Cohen et al. (1998) reported that the number of
IUCRCs increased by 154% during the 1980s.
There has also been a dramatic increase in university-industry
partnerships within the European Union and with collaborating states.  Siegel,
Westhead, and Wright (2002) report that the number of U.K. university science
9parks has increased from two in 1972 to 46 in 1999.  Caloghirou, Tsakanikas,
and Vonortas (2001) analysed 6,300 RJVs in 42 nations that received funding
from the European Commission, under the auspices of the European Framework
Programmes (FWPs), during 1983-1996.  The authors note that almost two
thirds of these RJVs involved at least one university, a percentage that has risen
considerably since the funding programme began (from 56% in 1983 to 67% in
1996).
In the next section, we discuss in some detail the particular market
failures that industry-university partnerships help to mitigate.
III. UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON INNOVATION MARKET FAILURES
There are several ways for universities and firms to form partnerships.  A
popular mechanism for establishing such a relationship occurs when a firm
contracts with university researcher to conduct R&D on its behalf.  Projects of
this nature tend to involve applied research or consultancy, rather than
fundamental research.6  These activities constitute a principal-agent
relationship, in which all property rights are vested in the firm.  Such contracts
are typically of a cost-plus form, where the firm bears all the risk and the agent
has weak incentives to maximise efficiency.  Of course, there are other types of
contracts - for example, payment by results.  Such agreements may be used if the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 Source: AUTM (2000).  See also Hicks et al. (2001) for further evidence on the growth of U.S.
university patenting and its geographical distribution.
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firm employs a private research contractor.  Indeed, if the firm were faced with
the alternative of contracting with a private research firm and a university, and
if both were equally good at doing research, then it would never contract with the
latter.  That is because a company gets a better deal contracting with a private
firm (or conducting the research internally).  A firm would only use the
university as a contractor if academic researchers were more proficient than
industry scientists in conducting the applied research (perhaps because
university scientists had conducted the underlying fundamental research) and
this gain were sufficiently great to offset the negative effects of using a cost-plus
contract.
At the other extreme is the case when a university researcher develops an
idea for commercialising some application of his/her work and enters into a
contract with a firm to do so.  In this case, all the intellectual property is vested
with the university and its relationship with the firm is simply to gain access to
business expertise to facilitate commercialisation of the product or process
innovation (e.g., pharmaceutical product).  Here the university is the principal
and the firm is the agent providing commercialisation services.  Now the
university has to bear the risk and may not be in a position to do this as a
publicly-funded body.  A likely result is that a spin-off company will be
established and this entity will enter into a relationship with the firm.  This type
of partnership is not really between the firm and the university, but between the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 The incentives of universities to get involved in such links have been analysed in Beath et al.
(2000).
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firm and the private spin-off company and thus, will look more like a
conventional research joint venture between two firms.7
An intermediate situation, but one that we shall argue is quite common,
occurs when the university has conducted some basic research that generates
new fundamental ideas.  From a commercial standpoint, these ideas are still at
an embryonic stage, although the fundamental work has been made available
through the normal public codified channels.  Unfortunately (from the firm’s
perspective), only a fraction of the knowledge is actually codified.  The remaining
fraction is tacit and can only be conveyed via direct interaction and discussion
with the scientists in the university.  However, the firm may only understand a
fraction of this fundamental knowledge through these channels of
communication, and this might be insufficient to allow it to develop the product
or technology.  The firm will therefore wish to employ the relevant scientists to
help them understand the knowledge better so that they can then decide how
best to develop this knowledge into some commercial product/technology.
In this case, all the development work is done by the firm, which bears the
risk that the development project might not succeed.  Hence, all property rights
in the technology/product are vested in the firm.  The fundamental knowledge is
still freely available.  All that is happening is that the university is helping the
firm improve its understanding of the knowledge.  However, this relationship
has contractual problems.  The relationship between the firm and the university
cannot be handled by a contract to deliver the remaining fraction of knowledge –
                                                          
7 See Katz and Ordover (1990), De Bondt (1997) and Poyago-Theotoky (1997) for surveys of the
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since the firm doesn’t know what that is, it cannot contract on this.  The
company is therefore limited to a rather simple input contract: it pays a fee and
buys specified amount of the academics’ time.  The firm bears the risk that (i) it
still might not fully understand the idea, however well academics spell it out,
and (ii) that the academics might not expend enough effort to explain it clearly.
Nevertheless, both sides have an incentive to establish such a partnership.
For firms, this relationship generates two benefits: (i) the acquisition of
knowledge that can ultimately generate additional profit and (ii) skill/knowledge
enhancement of its own scientific workforce.  As Cohen and Levinthal (1989)
have explained, such alliances may significantly enhance a firm’s capacity to
“absorb” certain specific knowledge, as well as related knowledge emanating
from other sources.  The university also derives several benefits.  First, the
additional income can be used to enhance fundamental research (e.g., through
the purchase of additional equipment or postdoctoral researchers to conduct
experiments).   Second, the existence of such relationships can be used to attract
and retain star scientists.  Finally, there may be in-kind benefits that accrue to
the university from these partnerships, such as an increase in the desire of
companies to employ students and additional sponsored research.
Another type of intermediate link occurs when universities and firms
collaborate to develop a product or technology.  In this case, inputs are required
from both parties.  Neither the firm nor the university can develop the idea
alone.  The added dimension to the case in the previous paragraph is that now
                                                                                                                                                                                    
literature on cooperative R&D amongst firms.
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there is an asset – the product/technology – that is jointly produced and so could
in principle be jointly owned.
As noted in Hall, Link and Scott (2001), such partnerships have become
increasingly popular.8   They assume a variety of forms, ranging from formal
contractual relationships managed through Technology Transfer Offices (e.g.,
licensing agreements between universities and firms and research joint
ventures) to more informal arrangements, such as educational partnerships (e.g.
the Teaching Company schemes in the UK or, special training programmes and
the hiring of graduate students) and consultancy arrangements.  As reported in a
recent National Academy of Engineering (NAE) study, summarised in Grossman,
Morgan and Reid (2001), informal alliances are potentially crucial sources of
technological spillovers.  The NAE study examined the contributions of academic
research to industrial performance in five major industries and concluded that in
some sectors, faculty consulting and educational partnerships played a key role
in the introduction of new production processes.
In view of the increasing importance of university-firm R&D partnerships
and their active support by government, it is natural to ask whether they have
beneficial effects in mitigating the market failures typically associated with
R&D.  The standard literature on this topic tends to focus on the R&D behaviour
of firms and identifies a number of issues.  In cases where timing matters as, for
example, in patent races and waiting games, the theory suggests that will be
over-investment in the former and under-investment in the latter and in both
                                                          
8 See also, Adams, Chiang and Starkey (2001) and Kaufmann and Tödtling (2001).
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cases, firms may be involved in unnecessarily duplicating each other’s research.
Typically these firms will be pursuing substitute research paths.  However, if the
paths they are pursuing are complementary, then these complementarities will
be under-exploited if firms are not sharing information and coordinating their
R&D activities.  These are all arguments in favour of research joint ventures as
these internalise the externalities involved and shift the allocation of resources
closer to the first best.9  However these are arguments that one would use when
considering firms.  It is not clear that these arguments necessarily apply to
technological partnerships between firms and universities.
In fact, there are three respects in which they are applicable.  The first
relates to research spillovers, the second to information asymmetries, and the
third to research complementarities.
An important component of the research done in universities is driven by
the desire of the individuals involved to answer fundamental questions and
scientists engaged on such pursuits may not necessarily see that there are
practical applications of results they obtain.  As noted earlier in this section,
through formal links with firms, such applications may be realised.  In this
sense, there is a useful spillover of knowledge from the university scientist to the
industrial technologist.  Since the additional gains can be shared if there is a
collaborative venture, the benefits associated with any given level of scientific
research effort are enhanced and more effort may be expended that would have
                                                          
9 Since the 1980’s both the United States and the European Union have actively encouraged
collaborative research by relaxing anti-trust laws in relation to cooperative R&D.  At the same
time, Japan has continued with its long-standing support of co-operative R&D.
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otherwise have been the case. This is a case where a beneficial externality is
perceived and exploited, something that might not otherwise have occurred.
Knowledge is a commodity in which asymmetries of information are
endemic.  For the buyer of a piece of knowledge, its quality may not be apparent
until an attempt is made to use it.   Markets in which there is this asymmetry
between sellers and buyers are naturally thin and mutually beneficial
transactions may be ruled out if buyers and sellers are in infrequent contact.
Building relationships between universities and firms can serve to bridge this
information gap and so promote the beneficial exploitation of fundamental
knowledge.  As indicated above, in the case of inventive ideas, a great deal of the
useful knowledge may be tacit and only fully appropriable, either through the
efforts of the person holding the knowledge or through close and easy interaction
between that person and those who could potentially use it.
Some innovations of a generic sort are best viewed as creating intellectual
human capital and are characterised by a natural excludability, as opposed to a
set of instructions for combining inputs and outputs that can be protected only
by intellectual property rights.  The natural excludability arises either from the
complexity or from the essentially tacit nature of the information required to
make effective use of the innovation.  Zucker et al. (1998) have argued that this
describes the nature of innovative activity during the first 10-15 years of the
biotechnology industry.  Specifically, the authors assert that there was a
naturally excludable knowledge base held by “a small initial group of
discoverers, their co-workers, and others who learned the knowledge from
16
working at the bench-science level with those possessing the requisite know-
how.”10  Eventually it became part of “routine science”.  The primary pattern in
the development of the industry was one of scientist-entrepreneurs who knew
how to do recombinant DNA.  Few of these academics were willing to give up
their university affiliation – perhaps for reasons of status, risk aversion, or for
signalling reasons - and laboratory teams.  Thus, they remained on the
university faculty while establishing a business on the side.
When universities and firms collaborate, they may be able to exploit
complementarities.  Companies are focused on commercialising university
science, by transforming the scientific knowledge base into useful goods for
which there is a market.  University scientists, on the other hand, are typically
highly specialised researchers and do not possess the requisite skills to
transform knowledge into useable technology and/or intermediate or final goods.
On the other hand, firms should, by definition, possess specialised skills for
commercialisation.  Joint ventures or partnerships between universities and
firms can exploit these complementarities, again to mutual advantage.  Another
example occurs when complementary equipment and facilities enable the
scaling-up of a new process from experimental to commercial to assess its market
feasibility.
In addition to these general arguments, we also wish to examine precisely
how such formal links between universities and firms mitigate market failures.
A recent paper by Jensen and Thursby (2001) is quite useful in this regard.
                                                          
10 Zucker et al. (1998), p. 291.
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Based on a survey of 62 universities, the authors report that the vast majority
(77%) of university-based inventions required some inventor involvement in
development.  For example, 48% of their sample reported that the innovation
was simply at the “proof of concept” stage, with no prototype, and a further 29%
had only reached the stage of a laboratory-scale prototype.  Thus once a licensee
is found, most university inventions require further development.  The empirical
evidence also indicates that efforts by licensees to develop embryonic inventions
alone are unlikely to succeed.  In 71% of the reported cases successful
development of the invention required cooperation by the inventor and the
licensee in that further development work.
To clarify these issues, we now present a formal analysis of the problem.11
Suppose that the embryonic invention with suitable and successful development
has a value V.  However, to realise this requires investment in effort by both the
scientist (denote this by e) and by the company (denote this by E) that acquires
it.12  The probability that these efforts will lead to a successful outcome can be
written, without significant loss of generality, as
( ) ( )p q e r E= + ,
where (i) 0 1p≤ <  and  (ii) q and r are functions that have diminishing marginal
return to effort.  The first best solution involves jointly choosing the effort levels
                                                          
11 The analysis draws on Aghion and Tirole (1994).
12 For present purposes we can think of e and E as being measured in monetary terms.
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*e and *E  to maximise the net return to undertaking the development of the
project.  The optimal levels of effort are where, for each party, the marginal
return to effort equals 
1
V
     and are illustrated in Figure 1.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
If the university licenses this invention to the firm at a fee L ( < V), this results
in under-investment.  The university scientist has no incentive to devote more
effort and thus, sets e = 0.13  The firm sets its effort level at E  where the
marginal return to effort equals 
1
V L
  
−  .  Clearly 
* *E e E< + : there is under-
investment.  If the university and the firm form a partnership for the
development of the invention, V will be shared.  On the assumption of
contractual incompleteness, the sharing rule cannot be conditioned on the effort
levels e and E.  Thus we shall consider this to be established by ex-ante
bargaining in which, for the sake of argument, each obtains 
2
V    .  The fact that
there is now an incentive for the scientist to put in effort will get us away from e
= 0.  In fact the equilibrium effort levels will be defined by the condition that the
marginal return to effort is equal to 
2
V
    .  Denote these effort levels as eˆ  and Eˆ .
There is still under-investment, for * *ˆeˆ E e E+ < + ; however is it the case that
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ˆeˆ E E+ > ?  Well, for incentive compatibility reasons L has to be less than 
2
V     so
that 
1 2
V L V
   
<   
−     and hence Eˆ E< .  So the partnership will improve aggregate
effort only if ˆeˆ E E> − .  While one cannot guarantee this is the case in such a
general set-up, it seems likely that this condition would hold and so we can see
why it is that this partnership arrangement can attenuate, though not eliminate,
the market failure of under-investment.
If investment and timing are positively correlated, the existence of such
university-firm linkages implies that the final product or process will reach the
market sooner. Simply put, university-industry partnerships appear to
accelerate technological diffusion.  This findings has important policy
implications, since it confirms the logic of the framers of the Bayh-Dole
legislation in the U.S., who asserted that university ownership and management
of intellectual property would accelerate commercialisation.14   With this result
in mind, it is not surprising to observe the formulation of policies that stimulate
the formation of university-industry partnerships.  Thus, in July 2000, the UK
government in setting out its policy for Science and Innovation in the White
Paper (titled Excellence and Opportunity), committed itself not only to funding
basic research but also to encouraging knowledge transfer and the effective
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Since effort is unobservable, it cannot be contracted on and so our analysis involves incomplete
contracts.
14 See Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2002).
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exploitation of knowledge and new technology.15   Given the growing incidence
and scope of industry-university partnerships, we discuss their benefits and
shortcomings in the next section.
IV. TRADE-OFFS ASSOCIATED WITH AN INCREASE IN
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS
Table 1 summarises the benefits and potential drawbacks of an increase in
university-industry partnerships.  Such alliances can potentially generate
positive private and social returns.  Private returns refer to direct sources of
revenue to the university, from licensing and equity income, and indirect
revenue sources, such as sponsored research, donations, and in-kind support
from companies.
Beath et al. (2000) examine the critical issue of how universities should
determine the optimal level of “taxation“ of research consulting agreements
between academics and firms.  Their model assumes that universities undertake
fundamental research with financial support from public agencies, which has
been dwindling in recent years in the U.S. and E.U.  To ease funding pressures,
university scientists can undertake research for industry, which can
simultaneously benefit the university, by suppressing academics salaries or
increasing revenue through the imposition of “overhead charges”.  This may
enable universities to hire more scientists, resulting in an increase the stock of
                                                          
15 It is seeking to encourage the commercialization of university research through things like the
University Challenge Fund, Science Enterprise Centres and the HE Innovation Fund.  These
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fundamental knowledge. Society may also be better off, given the public good
properties of knowledge.  That is, the resulting expansion in fundamental
research by universities is likely to raise the productivity of applied research in
the private sector, which could generate higher productivity growth (Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1991)).
It is conceivable that universities can also benefit from “reverse”
technology transfer (i.e., technology transfer that flows from firms to
universities), enabling academic scientists to conduct better experiments, as a
result of their interactions with industry scientists.16  These alliances may also
have a positive effect on the curriculum, as faculty members draw on their
experiences with firms to provide instruction that is more relevant and more
closely aligned with the needs of high-technology firms (see Stephan (2001)).
Positive social returns could also arise from more rapid technological diffusion,
resulting in an acceleration in the rate of development of new products and
processes, the creation of new firms, and enhanced economic development.
Richard Nelson (2001) argues that a major drawback of greater
commercialisation of university research is its potential degradation of the
culture of “open science” (Dasgupta and David (1994)) that permeates
institutions of higher learning.  Open science refers to the free exchange and
dissemination of new ideas among faculty members and students.  Such concerns
were magnified in the aftermath of a landmark event in the annals of university-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
funds are to be used in conjunction with Regional Development Agencies to support clusters and
incubators and “clubs”.
16 See Siegel, Waldman, and Link (1999) for some anecdotal evidence supporting this assertion.
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industry technology transfer: the 1998 strategic alliance between the
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology at the University of California at
Berkeley and Novartis, a Swiss life sciences and pharmaceutical firm.  This
alliance grants first rights to Novartis to negotiate licenses on approximately one
third of the department’s inventions for the next five years.  Press and Washburn
(2000) note that some were concerned that Novartis would attempt to influence
the department’s research agenda, since the Berkeley administration permitted
the company to have two of the five seats on the committee that decides how
research money is spent.
Alliances of this sort are highly controversial in biotechnology, where
there are especially close linkages between agribusiness firms and universities.
Indeed, some observers have noted that in this field, such partnerships may be
required for institutions that wish to remain at the cutting edge of research.
This has caused significant consternation to those opposed to the proliferation of
genetically modified foods and those who assert that the presence of private
firms at universities will alter the behaviour of academic scientists.
In this regard, several authors have examined changes in faculty
behaviour in the aftermath of their involvement in commercialisation activities.
Louis et al. (2001) find that academic scientists engaged in entrepreneurial
activities are more likely to deny requests from fellow academics for research
results than other faculty members who are not engaged in entrepreneurial
activities.  This result is consistent with Blumenthal et al. (1996), which reported
that faculty members with industry support are more secretive regarding their
23
research findings than faculty members without such industry support. Although
this finding should be interpreted with caution, since it could reflect selection
rather than causation, it does at least imply a positive correlation between
industry funding and secrecy.
Another open science concern relates to database protection and access.
Recent legislation in the E.U.17 has introduced sui generis protection on any
collection of information (databases) from unauthorised copying, while at the
same time urging the U.S. to enact similar legislation or face retaliation.  This
has sparked controversy regarding the potential difficulties associated with the
use of information contained in databases for the advancement of science,
especially in biotechnology and biomedicine, gene-mapping and bio-informatics
(Gardner and Rosenbaum (1998), Maurer and Scotchmer (1999)).18  The database
protection issue could possibly lead to what Heller and Eisenberg (1998) refer to
as an ‘anti-commons’ problem, i.e., a situation where it becomes increasingly
difficult to assign intellectual property rights to all of the parties involved in
creating a database.  These co-ordination difficulties create a scenario where it is
highly likely that scientists will have fewer incentives to use the database for
additional research, thus hampering the advancement of knowledge.  University-
industry partnerships in this area can potentially serve to resolve the conflict
between the culture of “open science” and the commercial exploitation of a
database, in the same manner that commercialisation of embryonic inventions
                                                          
17 European Union Council Directive 96/9/EC.
18 At the time of writing, it is not known whether the U.S. will pass similar legislation (Maurer,
Hugenholtz and Onsrud (2001).
24
has generated increased basic research.19
Another critical policy issue is whether university-industry partnerships
encourage a shift from basic to more applied research by academic scientists.
Interestingly, some preliminary evidence appears to contradict the conventional
wisdom that university technology transfer reduces the quantity and quality of
basic research performed by academics.  Zucker and Darby (1996) report that
“star” scientists in biotechnology had excellent research performance after
becoming involved in commercialisation and patenting.  Similarly, Louis et al.
(2001) find that entrepreneurial faculty members have higher scholarly
productivity than non-entrepreneurial faculty. These findings are consistent
with field evidence presented in Siegel, Waldman, and Link (1999), which
reported that faculty members involved in commercialisation projects typically
re-invest their “profits” in laboratory equipment and additional postdoctoral
researchers, enabling them to conduct additional experiments.
Furthermore, Stephan (2001) asserts that university-industry
partnerships could have negative effects on education, including the content and
quality of teaching, and faculty-students relationships. One concern is that
faculty members involved in commercialisation activities may spend less time on
teaching and service.  Alliances with industry may also shift attention away from
fundamental research questions that do not appear likely to generate a
commercial payoff. Additional secrecy may also have a deleterious effect on
                                                          
19 Maurer (2001) vividly describes the case of the Mutations Database Initiative (MDI) – a
worldwide organization of academic scientists - and Incyte in their (failed) attempt to
commercialize  human mutations data.
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relationships between faculty mentors and graduate students by creating conflict
and diminishing trust between advisor and student.  Such conflicts have recently
been reported at Chicago, Columbia, and Cornell Universities (Marshall (1999),
(2000)) where graduate students have initiated litigation against their respective
advisors and universities. Thus far, the courts have decided in favour of the
universities and there is no systematic evidence that these universities have
been hampered in their efforts to attract and retain graduate students.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our review of the extant literature indicates that we still know very
little about the global impact of the rise of university-industry partnerships.
Theoretical studies suggest that these alliances are needed to address innovation
market failures, especially those relating to basic research.  Unfortunately, there
is a paucity of empirical evidence on this topic, primarily because data
limitations preclude an accurate assessment of the private and social returns to
these activities.
We have reason to be optimistic that more precise empirical evidence is
likely to be available in the near future, given the trend towards greater scrutiny
of public investments in R&D.  As described in Link and Scott (1998), this stems,
in part, from recent initiatives to hold public technology-based institutions more
accountable for documenting the economic impact of the partnerships they have
financed.  Indeed, some qualitative evidence from the U.S. ATP Program
(Wessner (1999)) implies that the social returns to RJVs involving universities
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and firms are quite high.   Still, we need more systematic econometric studies for
a wide variety of programmes in different nations.
In order to have a better understanding of the trade-offs involved in
greater commercialisation, we need further research on the antecedents and
consequences of changes in faculty behaviour. This includes questions regarding
the impact of partnerships on the quantity and quality of basic research, the
culture of open science, and education.
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Table 1
Trade-offs Associated With An Increase in University-Industry
Partnerships
Benefits Drawbacks
Additional Revenue for the University
Negative Impact on Culture
of Open Science
More Rapid Technological Diffusion
Negative Impact on Student/Adviser
Relations
Choices Regarding Technological
Emphasis
Could Reduce the Quantity and
Quality of Basic Research
Positive Effects on Curriculum Negative Effects on Curriculum
Local/Regional Economic Development
Could Affect Types of Research
Questions Addressed
Two Way-Knowledge Transfer
Academics Could Spend Less Time
on Teaching and Service
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